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Abstract: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) presents a challenging context in 
which to respond to public health crises. Its 2018–2020 Ebola outbreak was the second 
largest in history. Lessons were known from the previous West African outbreak. Chief 
among these was the recognition that local action and involvement are key to establishing 
effective epidemic-response. It remains unclear whether and how this was achieved in DRC’s 
Ebola response. Additionally, there is a lack of scholarship on how to build resilience (the 
ability to adapt or transform under pressure) in crisis-response. In this article, we critically 
review literature to examine evidence on whether and how communities were involved, trust 
built, and resilience strengthened through adaptation or transformation of DRC’s 2018–2020 
Ebola response measures. Overall, we found limited evidence that the response adapted to 
engage and involve local actors and institutions or respond to locally expressed concerns. 
When adaptations occurred, they were shaped by national and international actors rather than 
enabling local actors to develop locally trusted initiatives. Communities were “engaged” to 
understand their perceptions but were not involved in decision-making or shaping responses. 
Few studies documented how trust was built or analyzed power dynamics between different 
groups in DRC. Yet, both these elements appear to be critical in building effective, resilient 
responses. These failures occurred because there was no willingness by the national govern-
ment or international agencies to concede decision-making power to local people. 
Emergency humanitarian response is entrenched in highly medicalized, military style com-
mand and control approaches which have no space for decentralizing decision-making to 
“non-experts”. To transform humanitarian responses, international responders can no longer 
be regarded as “experts” who own the knowledge and control the response. To successfully 
tackle future humanitarian crises requires a transformation of international humanitarian and 
emergency response systems such that they are led, or shaped, through inclusive, equitable 
collaboration with local actors. 
Keywords: Democratic Republic of Congo, Ebola, pandemic response, humanitarian 
emergency, community, social science
Background and Context
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced multiple humanitarian 
crises, including a brutal, exploitative colonial history, entrenched poverty and post- 
colonial neglect, eleven outbreaks of Ebola Virus Disease since 1976 and wide-
spread, longstanding armed conflict and fragile state institutions. This means the 
reach of formal government structures, including healthcare provision, is frequently 
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disrupted or contested. The 11th Ebola outbreak in DRC 
was declared on 1st June 2020 in Équateur Province, 
North Western DRC. It was declared over less than six 
months later (on 18th November 2020) having, in part, 
benefitted from the widespread availability of Ebola 
vaccines.1 A new (12th) outbreak, declared on February 
7th 2021, may also benefit from vaccine availability.
A month after the 11th outbreak was declared, the devastat-
ing tenth outbreak, the second largest Ebola outbreak in his-
tory, was finally declared over (on 25th June 2020). The tenth 
outbreak was first declared by the DRC government in 
Kinshasa in August 2018 in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces 
(later spreading to South Kivu) in Eastern DRC.1 It took 
almost two years to combat, claiming 2299 lives.1 
Widespread armed conflict hampered response efforts and 
was widely blamed for the failure of international and national 
responders to bring the outbreak under rapid control; however, 
many critical voices raised during the outbreak suggest a more 
complex explanation and a significant failure of the WHO-led 
response to learn clear lessons from the 2013–16 West African 
outbreak, the largest in history, particularly around the need for 
rapid involvement of frontline communities, localization of 
the response and trust building.2–6
Eastern DRC is, indisputably, a challenging context for 
any response effort. Dozens of militia groups have caused 
insecurity for the past 25 years killing around 15,000 people 
over the last decade and displacing millions in the last three 
years alone.7 Rebel groups belonging to the Allied Democratic 
Forces (ADF) are accused of many of the massacres. The ADF 
is thought to be a militia force of mainly Muslim Ugandans 
installed in the area since 1995 with the eventual aim of 
undertaking attacks against Kampala. On 30th October 2019, 
in the midst of the Ebola epidemic, the Congolese Army 
launched an offensive against the ADF, who subsequently 
retaliated, killing more than 200 civilians in Beni (North 
Kivu). Civilians in turn attacked the UN peace-keeping forces’ 
bases there in frustration that the UN was unable to protect 
them.6 The Congolese army suffered further losses in January 
2020.8 This is a kind of warfare in which it is not easy to see 
the opposed sides.9 The impotent UN presence was seen in 
many local peoples’ eyes as connected to presence of the 
international Ebola-responders, who were therefore also 
regarded with hostility as all outsiders are treated with suspi-
cion. This situation encourages local people to cope with crises 
by introversion in order to survive.
This follows a more general pattern of recent conflict in 
tropical Africa. A violence that appears arbitrary and unpre-
dictable encourages strong local defensiveness and self- 
reliance. This was seen in wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
where local civilian defense (similar to the heterogeneous 
local, armed defense groups in DRC sometimes termed “mai 
mai”) protected communities but greatly increased the com-
plexity of the eventual peace process.4,5 An unanticipated 
bonus, however, was that the resourcefulness and resilience 
of local defenders became an asset for Ebola response, as has 
been documented for the major West African outbreak of the 
disease in 2013–16.10 Studies showed that local activists – 
sometimes explicitly labelling themselves as an Ebola defense 
force, modeled along earlier civil defense lines – mobilized a 
coherent response to the Ebola outbreak well before a national 
strategy or international support materialized; local learning 
was often rapid and inspired, such as improvising personal 
protective equipment and taking unilateral action to success-
fully quarantine isolated villages.2,10,11
Yet this local learning was initially ignored by international 
responders, as were community concerns, and little attempt 
was made to integrate them into a mutually acceptable and 
trusted coherent national response.2,11 Like in DRC, after the 
outbreak was declared, an international emergency response 
paradigm was put in motion based on hierarchical medical 
(and often militarized) responses that tended to ignore local 
knowledge and learning and conducted only token “commu-
nity engagement”.2,12 This can undermine the effectiveness of 
crisis-responses, as well as failing to build longer-term resi-
lience. Thus, in Sierra Leone emergency health interventions 
were made more difficult when people hid their sick, refusing 
to seek treatment and showing hostility to professional health 
workers.13–15 These same issues emerged in the North Kivu 
outbreak in DRC, where there appears to have been little 
learning from earlier but manifestly similar situations in 
West Africa.2 In Sierra Leone, the epidemic began to come 
under control when the concerns underlying these apparently 
perverse reactions were addressed, through (for example) local 
recruitment of burial teams and establishment of community- 
based care centers.14,16
Local action and involvement are now widely acknowl-
edged as key to establishing effective crisis-response, yet it 
remains unclear whether and how this was finally achieved in 
DRC. There is also little understanding of what community 
engagement really means in humanitarian contexts, what 
constitute “successful” approaches and why they work.17,18 
In this review article, therefore, we apply a new analytical 
approach to critically review literature that describes on-the- 
ground challenges to the 2018–20 Ebola response in DRC, 
particularly in terms of involving communities and building 
trust.
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Analytical Approach: An 
Institutional Resilience Lens for 
Crisis Response
Through the 1990s and 2000s, much international attention 
was given to health systems strengthening.19–21 However, 
more recent interest in health systems resilience22 allows 
for consideration of health systems’ capacity for agile 
responses, including to major crises, and how they are 
affected by these to adapt or transform. We examine the 
literature using an analytical framework developed by co- 
authors (SM, PR, and DB) for (and later informed by) 
research they conducted on the Ebola response in Sierra 
Leone (see: https://responding-to-ebola.org/). This is shown 
in Figure 1.
The framework draws on conceptualizations of resili-
ence across a range of disciplines including health systems, 
management theory, resilience literature (in relation to sys-
tems, institutions, individuals), climate and environmental 
change (including notions of environmental resilience), and 
institutional theories from economics, sociology and 
anthropology. It allows us to systematically examine and 
understand complex humanitarian-response challenges.
Contemporary notions of resilience are heavily 
informed by ecological understanding (related to climate 
change and environmental resilience literature) which has 
more recently been applied in institutional management 
theory23 Vulnerability and disruption of a system occurs 
when there is a critical “tipping point”. In ecology a 
critical tipping point could be a catastrophic rise in CO2 
levels; in a health system, it could be a catastrophic shock 
like a rapidly spreading Ebola epidemic, or an outbreak of 
armed conflict. This shock leads to vulnerability and col-
lapse, or adaptation that may or may not lead to systemic 
transformation. This understanding provides the backdrop 
to our analysis which is concerned with examining how 
and why communities and health systems are disrupted, 
collapse, and in what situations they adapt or transform. 
To further inform our analysis, we draw on scholarship 
from the health policy and systems literature.
Central to our framework are both health systems 
institutions and social institutions – we examine whether 
and how they were disrupted by the Ebola crisis or able to 
respond in ways that enabled adaptation or ultimate trans-
formation. Classic health policy scholarship, applied to 
understanding of health systems, emphasizes the need to 
understand the range and roles of actors (people) and their 
institutions (both formal and informal), key processes 
(including coordination, communication and governance) 
and wider political contexts.22,24,25 Health systems scho-
larship also distinguishes between hardware components 
(structures and inputs, including emergency funding and 
resources) and software which encompasses less tangible 
(but fundamental) elements like trust, power and relation-
ships between people, that shape institutions, affect how 
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Figure 1 Conceptualizing health systems responses to outbreaks.
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our framework, these software concepts are manifest in the 
arrows that denote the interaction hierarchies that connect 
the different levels of action (from international to village).
The institutional level (both health systems institutions 
and social institutions) is central to understanding resili-
ence (the ability to adapt or transform under pressure). 
Very often in crises, the problem is rigidity, and the 
inability of the systems to retain resilient core functions 
while having flexibility to adapt (or even transform) some 
of their elements and processes. This was seen very clearly 
in the case of Ebola burials in West Africa where commu-
nities maintained a high degree of social solidarity, in 
terrifying circumstances that might otherwise have led to 
social fracture and dispersal, through means such as large 
burial ceremonies that cemented social cohesion but at the 
same time were sources of Ebola infection. This poses the 
puzzle of how to secure institutional resilience flexible 
enough to meet the challenges of infection control.
Institutions are a major focus of attention across all 
social science disciplines, and theoretical frameworks 
vary. In economics, the approach of Douglass North has 
been influential. This emphasizes institutional change over 
time and focuses on the conditions under which “good” 
institutions are selected and thrive.28 The approach has 
been influential in debates on recent armed conflicts in 
Africa.29 Another approach - looking at how co-existing 
institutions combine or conflict - is sometimes credited to 
the influence of the economist Oliver Williamson, the 
sociologist Erving Goffman and the anthropologist Mary 
Douglas. Williamson points to the ways that institutions 
sometimes display conflicted organizational principles, 
and advocates transactions costs as a way of managing 
such disparities.30 Goffman and Douglas advocate a so- 
called neo-Durkheimian approach, in which attention is 
focused on the kinds of actions that cultivate or change 
institutional understandings and practices, including ritual 
action.31,32 A key feature of this approach is to identify 
causes of institutional or organizational conflict and do 
things differently. We can return to the example of funerals 
under Ebola to illustrate this. Attempts to ban funerals as 
dangerous sources of infection were counter-productive in 
West Africa, since a funeral reinforces institutional values 
damaged by death – inter-family cooperation.13,16 A key to 
better infection control was not to ban funerals but to 
involve communities in generating a modified process of 
safe and dignified burial for those who died of the 
disease.33 Social and medical institutions needed to adapt 
their processes in order to continue to be effective.
Building on this, our understanding of the health 
system is not confined to one dimension. Most health 
policy and systems frameworks seek to identify a “locus 
of control” by actors in formal health systems institu-
tions, usually with government playing a role as a “stew-
ard” overseeing the overall system functioning.20 
Consequently, most frameworks that consider health sys-
tem institutions and their governance focus primarily on 
formal health institutions and actors and national-level 
governance.34 Yet, as both the Ebola examples above and 
work on anti-corruption in the health system show, there 
may be a significant discrepancy between formal struc-
tures and informal practices, shaped by social norms and 
experiences which can undermine formal systems pro-
cesses (and institutions) by redistributing power and 
access to resources.35 The lack of attention to local insti-
tutions and social networks and their interactions, parti-
cularly in terms of power, is a notable gap in both health 
systems and humanitarian response scholarship. We 
looked to scholarship outside the health sector to consider 
the relational aspects of how different actors, from dif-
ferent co-existing and interacting institutions, can work 
together with greater stakeholder inclusivity within and 
across different levels – an approach that has been termed 
“multi-modal” or “distributed governance”.36,37 Our fra-
mework therefore highlights the multiple levels at which 
health and social systems operate from the global- 
national interface through the districts to the village and 
family level – and the relationships by which they inter-
act. These relationships are functions of power and trust 
which are negotiated through interactions.38 In our fra-
mework, these are shown as top-down power-based rela-
tionships or bottom-up trust-based interactions. All of 
these elements are acknowledged to operate in a wider 
historical, political context.
In DRC multiple actors and institutions play impor-
tant roles, including government and rebel leaders, local 
chiefs and headmen, traditional healers, village-based 
health workers, as well as village residents. The context 
is complex: ongoing, unpredictable armed conflict (from 
colonial to present times) has led to forced displace-
ments, fragile state institutions, weak health systems 
(particularly in the areas worst affected by conflict), 
mistrust and poverty. In the midst of this are strong 
local cultures including a strong sense of local solidarity 
informed by Ubuntu thinking (ie, shared common 
humanity), traditional knowledge and traditional healing 
practices. In our analysis, we apply the conceptual 
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framework described above, to identify key actors and 
institutions and analyze the socio-political context in 
which they operate and whether and how their relation-
ships shaped the response to the 2018–20 Ebola 
response in DRC, to achieve system adaptation and 
transformation following the outbreak.
Methods and Search Strategy
Peer-reviewed journal literature were systematically 
searched from 1976 (when Ebola was discovered) until 
March 2020 across three databases: Embase, Global 
Health, Medline, yielding 112 articles after abstract 
screening. Search terms covered database-specific terms 
encompassing multiple variations of: Ebola AND Congo/ 
DRC AND humanitarian/epidemic response. For analysis 
of the 2018–20 response, we selected only publications 
relevant to that outbreak, but we retained papers relating to 
earlier Ebola responses in a separate file and drew on them 
where they held relevant insights for our background and 
discussion.
Additionally, after March 2020 Google Scholar searches 
for “Trust”, “Ebola”, “DRC” were conducted and four 
researchers working in DRC Ebola-response, or on trust in 
humanitarian responses in Africa, were emailed for sugges-
tions for other relevant papers. Co-authors (PK, KB, CK) 
based in DRC also provided reports, papers and documents 
on the response. Some of these sources provided studies in 
French, including those written by Francophone African 
authors, although our database searches of peer-review pub-
lications were solely in English.
After screening of titles, abstracts and full texts from 
all sources, data from 41 retained documents were sum-
marized in spreadsheet tables for analysis. Data were 
analyzed according to the domains in our analytical frame-
work while allowing new themes to emerge. The narration 
of findings reflect the predominant themes in the literature 
around key actors, their relationship and role in system 
adaptation and transformation.
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria for 
Systematic Search of Databases
Included documents: English language studies (or English 
translations of French texts); studies reporting primary 
data on response actions and/or consequences; progress 
reports detailing response actions; rapid surveys and 
research reports written to inform the response.
Excluded documents: non-English language (for which 
no English translation was available); clinical studies; 
conference proceedings; speculative modelling papers; 
morbidity/mortality reports; opinion pieces (unless they 
detailed frontline responses or data).
Given that DRC is francophone the limiting of articles 
to those written in English could have been seen as a 
serious limitation. However, it should be noted that many 
international frontline responders (from WHO, Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF) and other international agencies) 
published regularly in English throughout the outbreak. 
Furthermore, official polls, progress-reports and social- 
science data collected by responders are available in 
English. Additional (unlimited) searches found few 
directly relevant articles in French. Our Congolese co- 
authors proposed documents in French. We feel, therefore, 
that it is unlikely that we have missed any obvious, sig-
nificant sources that only appear in French.
Challenges in Negotiating 
Relationships for Crisis Response 
During the 2018–2020 Ebola 
Outbreak in DRC
The 2018 Ebola outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri 
Provinces was on a much larger scale than any previously 
experienced in DRC. WHO mobilized technical support 
far more rapidly than it had done in West Africa, with 
laboratory support and international agencies bringing 
personnel, equipment and resources.39 Furthermore, the 
2018 epidemic was unique in having vaccines (developed 
during the West Africa outbreak) available for the first 
time and these constituted an important part of the 
response.40,41 A major adaptation the formal health sys-
tem underwent was to mobilize to roll out the new Ebola 
vaccines as they arrived, despite the difficulties created 
by ongoing insecurity, vaccinating more than 320,000 
people.6 Yet, despite a rapid technical international 
response and the availability of vaccines the outbreak 
became the second largest in history continuing for 
almost two years.
Relationships between health systems and social actors 
and institutions, shaped by their wider socio-political con-
text, are key to understanding why this was so. The sub-
sequent results sections of this paper focus on three key 
cross-cutting thematic issues that emerged from our review 
– violence and mistrust; local perceptions, communication 
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and involvement; trust building – and how they enabled or 
obstructed system adaptation and transformation.
Violence and Mistrust
A number of papers point to two key factors compounding 
response efforts: the ongoing armed conflict, and commu-
nity mistrust and lack of involvement.6,39,40,42 Two quan-
titative papers show clear associations of violence with an 
increase in estimated Ebola transmission rates43 and a 
reduction in rapid case isolation and vaccine uptake.44 
Violence in Eastern DRC has also endangered health per-
sonnel and, over years, destroyed facilities and compro-
mised infrastructure.6 Similarly, two other studies show 
statistical correlations between mistrust and misinforma-
tion and a decreased likelihood of adopting preventive 
behavior including vaccine uptake,42,45 as well as outright 
hostility to responders.42
These two factors – violence and mistrust – and the 
institutions and actors that perpetrate them are deeply 
connected with each other. Years of armed conflict 
between rebel and government forces – at times 
meted out by both on civilians – has forged people’s 
deep mistrust of state institutions and activities.42,46 
The Kinshasa government had ignored outbreaks in 
poor, remote areas before47 but the opposition of 
many people in Eastern DRC to the Joseph Kabila 
government as well as the area’s ongoing instability 
added another layer of disenfranchisement. Many 
authors note the failure of both the Kabila government 
and international forces to protect people from years of 
intimidation and massacres from armed rebel groups, 
as well as a long history of brutal colonial and post- 
colonial neglect and exploitation.6,10,48,49 Collectively 
these experiences entrenched mistrust of any authority 
and during the Ebola response this mistrust naturally 
extended to foreign “experts” and biomedical scientists 
who came in to stamp their authority on the response.4 
Moreover, suspicions of the Kinshasa government were 
fueled further by the prevention of planned elections in 
2018 which, though ostensibly because of the virus, 
was regarded as politically motived perpetuating suspi-
cions that Ebola was a government-induced illness – a 
situation that was used by opposition political leaders 
to further undermine government legitimacy.50,51
Rohan and McKay (2020)6 note how the response 
itself had exacerbated insecurity because international 
responders had sought securitization of their actions. In 
some places, road travel was so dangerous that 
(foreign) health responders travelled in armored vehi-
cles wearing flak jackets and helmets; this then con-
flated medical responders with the armed forces that 
were so distrusted, which then legitimized attacks on 
Ebola response staff.6 These connections are corrobo-
rated by the local perspectives from North Kivu 
described in Box 1.
Moran (2018)48 cites a Ministry of Health official 
quoting information from his own team of anthropologists 
on the negative perceptions of government and interna-
tional responders in the wider context of political and 
armed violence:
[t]he [Congolese] Government is criticized for not doing 
enough to make it safe. The UN is judged to be complicit 
in the massacres here, and for not protecting the 
Box 1 Perspectives from North Kivu
Unpublished interview data collected from Beni, North Kivu, in 
December 2019 by a co-author (PMK), noted that there was 
considerable hostility at first, when the response was led by outsiders 
with expensive cars. People were suspicious of their motives, believing 
the outsiders wanted to kill them. This was because they saw the 
external responders as linked to recent massacres they had suffered, 
which had been ignored by the Congolese government and its army. A 
respondent described how since 2014, when killings started in the Beni 
area, up to the present day no international organization had intervened 
to assist family members who were victims of massacres (like orphans, 
host house members) but suddenly for Ebola more than 50 international 
agencies arrived in the area. Food aid was thought to be poisoned as part 
of the plot to kill them and was rejected; there were numerous locally 
backed attacks on health facilities. After these attacks on health centers, 
efforts were made to integrate local people into the response teams. 
Local armed Mai Mai groups (who sought to protect local communities 
from other militias) promoted work with local doctors, nurses, religious 
leaders and members of women’s and youth associations. Nevertheless, 
many suspicions remained. When asked how Ebola survivors were 
regarded a respondent noted that when the survivors talked about the 
need to trust the medical responders they were dismissed as having been 
paid to say that.
The Mai Mai reportedly hold a variety of beliefs about Ebola, including 
that it was a plot by the ADF and other armed groups involved in 
previous massacres, to complete the destruction of the local Nande 
people. Local chiefs (who derive from locally recognized lineages but 
also have formal political legitimacy conferred by government) 
generally carry respect and authority, as do local churches, though 
they also reportedly contributed to local suspicions by denying the 
existence of the disease or misappropriating response-resources. This 
issue of misappropriation of emergency response funds and resources 
which came flooding in fueling widespread resentment, was a 
phenomenon in the West Africa outbreak too where it was known as 
“Ebola money”.60
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population except for a few battalions. And NGOs, people 
think they are here just to make money. (p.1296) 
Local people saw “Ebola money” pouring in to a gov-
ernment that had failed to provide them with basic 
protection or infrastructure, and saw that money clearly 
benefitting elites, businesses and aid workers (who 
were visibly richer than locals) so they frequently 
questioned why there was money to fight Ebola but 
not the rebels causing such destruction.6,52 In data 
collected by international responders, compiled by the 
Social Science in Humanitarian Platform (SSHAP), one 
respondent notes that “refusal to wash hands is a poli-
tical action because nobody is dealing with the 
massacres”.53 The widespread perception that the inter-
national community is not interested in the challenges 
local people face, beyond Ebola outcomes, was rein-
forced by events like the measles outbreak that killed 
more than 6600, mainly children, across DRC between 
January 2019 and June 2020 but received almost no 
international attention54,55 and the lack of attention to 
other diseases was noted in multiple “engagement” 
sessions run by responders.53,56–59
In this challenging context, in which all non-local 
institutions and actors are distrusted and local people 
frequently rely on their own resourcefulness to survive, 
working through community interlocutors and local 
frontline health workers to build trust is critical. The 
next sections examine the evidence on whether and 
how local people were involved and trust was built in 
the DRC Ebola response, and the extent to which 
lessons were learned from the West Africa 
outbreak.
Local Perceptions, Communication 
and Involvement
A “Grand Bargain” was signed in 2016 by over 60 major 
donors and humanitarian agencies, who pledged to recog-
nize the critical role of local responders in humanitarian 
action.61 Despite a large literature on community partici-
pation in health systems research,17,62 this has not been 
applied to the context of crisis-response. Although a num-
ber of crisis-response scholars highlight that communities 
are not homogenous,38,63,64 there is little scholarship on 
understanding what constitutes “community” or “local” in 
crisis-response and the terms are frequently used 
uncritically.61 There was, in the 2018–20 outbreak, a con-
certed effort to engage with various members of 
communities to understand what their perceptions were. 
Rich qualitative data were collected from August 2018 at 
least until December 2019 by UNICEF, the International 
Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), Oxfam and other 
international responders. This was compiled and analyzed, 
with recommendations for practice, by the Social Science 
in Humanitarian Action Platform in an excellent series of 
briefings.65
The extent to which these recommendations were put 
into practice, however, is less than clear and aside from 
these “data collection” meetings held by responders, critics 
of the DRC response claim that in practice “community 
engagement often meant little more than issuing instruc-
tions” (p.1494).3 This is borne out by locally representa-
tive polls from mid-2019 (a year into the outbreak) which 
showed that engagement was still insufficient and more 
was “needed to demonstrate respect toward the commu-
nity, involve local authorities and support meaningful par-
ticipation and feedback” (#18p.18).51
Although SSHAPS preparedness66 and behavioral 
briefings53,56–59 identify a wide range of potential stake-
holders and trusted interlocuters, including traditional hea-
lers, we found no studies or reports confirming that these 
interlocutors had been engaged in any systematic way. The 
briefings also made a good attempt to systematically cap-
ture rumors and perspectives from people in Eastern DRC, 
some of which had clear, practical implications for simple 
changes, for example, the colors used for PPE were tradi-
tionally associated with death and bad omens, therefore, 
had a negative impact.56 The very first briefing, using data 
collected between August and October 2018, noted that 
“the more local the institution the more favorably it was 
seen by respondents” who wanted to see “their” people 
and doctors leading the local response.53 This intelligence, 
which reinforced what was already known from the West 
Africa outbreak on the need for local involvement and 
ownership,2,16,67 appears not to have been acted on. By 
the final briefing, using data from November to December 
2019, there is a notable increase in negative perceptions in 
some areas, with respondents reporting widespread suspi-
cions of the motives of responders and frustration with the 
response which was seen as deeply politicized.59 These 
suspicions and frustrations are corroborated by other, aca-
demic, studies.42,46
The potentially negative effect of rumors and myths on 
Ebola response is known from previous outbreaks,47,68 
although we only found two academic papers analyzing 
these in the 2018–20 outbreak. Kasereka and Hawkes 
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(2019)69 analyzed the rumors and myths that persisted in 
the early months of the outbreak, which “may have fueled 
the ‘underground’ transmission of Ebola, as patients 
sought care from traditional healers”. As the epidemic 
progressed, they found that these rumors appeared to dis-
sipate as biomedical transmission became generally 
accepted. People also rapidly took on board the zoonotic 
nature of the disease and the nosocomial aspects of its 
spread. Muzembo et al (2020)50 found a range of beliefs 
about the causes and origins of Ebola and rumors fueled 
by widespread distrust in national political actors and 
international responders, regarded spreading Ebola as 
part of a multinational plot to kill local people.
Yet, despite a wealth of evidence about potentially 
dangerous rumors and practical recommendations for 
engaging and involving local authorities to build trust 
and help address them, there seems to have been little 
attempt to implement these leading to one frontline com-
mentator accusing many efforts to engage with commu-
nities of being “tone deaf”.4 This is corroborated by a 
report, released in March 2019, from Translators Without 
Borders (TWB), who surveyed residents in Goma (North 
Kivu) about their understanding of key response 
messages.70 A majority of written and oral communica-
tions were French or “standardized” Swahili (spoken in 
Uganda and Tanzania) which many respondents, particu-
larly women and older people who were less literate, could 
not understand. Many key concepts relating to prevention 
and treatment were therefore misunderstood. TWB con-
cluded that effective communication depends on key mes-
sages and material being designed in locally understood 
Swahili – which requires development and testing of mate-
rials as locally as possible. We found no evidence that 
these recommendations were acted on. Indeed, the final 
SSHAP briefing (data from December 2019) reported 
frustrations of frontline health workers who were left to 
translate key terms and acronyms themselves and found 
that local people’s frustrations at lack of clarity in com-
munications were taken out on the local workers, who 
consequently felt undermined.59 Such deficiencies contrib-
uted to undermining the positions and safety of local 
health workers who, despite being initially trusted by 
their communities,53,70 reported fearing attack from fru-
strated local communities as the epidemic progressed.58
Although important adaptions were made in terms of 
systematic collection of data on local perceptions that 
could have transformed response approaches to commu-
nity engagement, communication and involvement, there 
seems limited evidence of any subsequent adaptation or 
transformation of practice. Poor communication and lack 
of meaningful community involvement (including local 
health workers) in shaping the response, risked further 
undermining trust.
Trust-Building
Trust is recognized by international agencies as a “build-
ing block” for fighting diseases in complex humanitarian 
emergencies.71 Despite this, we found a surprising dearth 
of literature or reports documenting any real actions or 
experiences of how trust was actually built with commu-
nities and local responders in the DRC outbreak. We there-
fore widened our search to include lessons from West 
Africa. Six papers were identified (five from West 
Africa) whose core findings on practical actions for trust- 
building and community engagement (which fosters trust) 
are shown in Table 1.
Of these studies, Gillespie et al (2016)72 take a more 
traditional approach based on specific actions (particular 
activities and mechanisms) while the others detail 
approaches to, or principles of, engagement, that will 
build trust. Kasali (2019),46 the only study from DRC, 
emphasizes some of the issues described above on the 
need for clear, consistent communications to explain the 
strategies being implemented and emphasize their political 
neutrality, and the need for mechanisms to respond to 
ongoing community feedback. Two papers describe how 
national and international responders can build trust at 
local level. Enria et al (2016)63 highlight the importance 
of dialogue and engaging with intra-community power 
dynamics. Dada et al (2019)73 describe how they 
attempted to put in place a respectful two-way information 
flow during vaccine trials. In the fragmented context of 
DRC, such opportunities for dedicated community liaison 
and social science teams working with community are 
limited, nevertheless the principles of reciprocity and 
respectful relationships as well as relatable messaging are 
transferrable. Ryan et al (2020)74 “technologies of trust” 
emphasize open, reflexive and accountable relationships 
that genuinely listen to and incorporate local perspectives. 
Finally, Tsai et al's (2020)75 interesting analysis identifies 
local “intermediary” response-volunteers who are 
embedded in their communities as particularly effective, 
in large part because they are known locally and are there-
fore vulnerable to local sanction, which gives them legiti-
macy. They then become trusted conveyors of information 
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(interlocutors) both to and from “formal” (or outside) 
responders.
Gillespie et al (2016)72 (in relation to UNICEF’s actions) 
call for engagement approaches to be formally incorporated 
(and funded) within the global humanitarian response archi-
tecture. While this is important, the evidence reviewed sug-
gests that “engagement approaches” will not be effective 
unless they explicitly promote the principles or technologies 
of trust that have respectful, open and accountable relation-
ships at their core, as the other papers highlight. Experience 
from West Africa shows that such respectful, accountable 
relationships were manifest when national and international 
responders were able to listen to community concerns and act 
on them by changing their responses – in other words, when 
the response systems had the flexibility to adapt or transform 
their procedures. Rohan and McKay (2020)6 describe, and 
we have shown, the “evidentiary inertia” that was too often 
apparent in the DRC response. The safe and dignified burials 
program33 was one of the few West Africa lessons that was 
acted on early in the DRC response. Many local community- 
based burial teams were trained and supplied with personal 
protective equipment. However, other locally resented 
actions took much longer to change. Locally collected evi-
dence in North Kivu showed deep unhappiness with the 
burning of household belongings outside the homes of 
infected people, but it took months to change IPC protocols 
for disposing of infectious items. Similarly, chlorine spray 
was widely used as a disinfection measure until a year into 
the response, despite clear evidence from West Africa that it 
was ineffective and created local resentment because of the 
negative health outcomes for people close to the spraying.6
Finally, an important insight on trust in the Ebola out-
break in North Kivu comes from an opinion piece con-
tributed to the New England Journal of Medicine by Vinh- 
Kim Nguyen (2019).4 The author is trained both as a 
medical doctor and as an anthropologist and was posted 
to an MSF Ebola case handling facility at Kayna, half-way 
between Goma and Butembo. Butembo was the epicentre 
of the outbreak in North Kivu, and the scene of armed 
attacks that partially destroyed MSF regional Ebola treat-
ment hubs in February 2019. Using his anthropological 
training, and earlier experience in the West African Ebola 
epidemic, Nguyen took careful note of local suspicions. 
Why had the responders come only when people began to 
die of Ebola, and not during earlier outbreaks of other 
deadly diseases or massacres? This caused people to sus-
pect there might be a hidden, ulterior motive for the huge 
international Ebola response. The implication was clear. 
Change attitudes by changing the intervention (ie, trans-
form). In response, the MSF team at Kayna took a more 
active approach to other diseases, by additionally treating 
severe cerebral malaria, typhoid, sepsis and even cholera. 
This helped diffuse the suspicion generated by a focus on 
one deadly disease among many. The same transition had 
been earlier achieved in Sierra Leone when large, closed 
and highly feared Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs) were 
later complemented by local triage centers (Community 
Care Centers). In this case, rapid testing allowed Ebola 
cases to be spotted early enough for them to be safely 
transported to an ETC, while other patients were treated 
and discharged.16 This fostered a local sense of ownership 
of both the treatment facility and the diagnostic process. 
Resistance to the idea of transferring a patient to a more 
distant specialist Ebola handling facility lessened when 
patients with other diseases were being cured and dis-
charged. The community saw itself as being better pro-
tected by a comprehensive interest in its welfare (a social 
institutional value), than by isolating out one dangerous 
disease among many. This in turn fostered the trust that 
proved so elusive in DRC.
The evidence shows that some adaptations were made 
by international responders to enable local involvement 
and build trust during the response, but these were limited 
or small scale and often very delayed. Indeed, as Box 2 
illustrates, opportunities were not taken that could have 
enabled local intellectual leadership to advise on how to 
transform the response.
Rethinking Humanitarian Response
In our review we have sought to understand how institu-
tions, processes and networks of actors interacted with 
each other to shape the response to the 2018–20 Ebola 
outbreak in DRC – and the implications of this for resilient 
outbreak response. To do so, we used our framework that 
focused on relationships between key actors and institu-
tions and the extent to which this shaped the ability to 
adapt or transform the response. Local domains came 
through strongly in the literature as important in shaping 
the response – in particular the interaction between inter-
national responders and local actors. In the final sections 
of this paper we discuss the reasons why the international 
Ebola response in DRC showed only limited adaptation 
and little transformation; and the role of power dynamics 
and neo-colonialism in explaining this.
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Limited Adaptation or 
Transformation in the DRC 
Response
As we have seen there was deep mistrust in both national 
government and foreign UN agencies before the outbreak 
because of the failure of all parties to prevent armed 
violence against people in Eastern DRC. This mistrust 
then extended to international humanitarian responders 
and the violence and mistrust fueled each other. In this 
context, local people (including local health workers) were 
the only ones who could make trusted, locally acceptable 
and accountable decisions about response practices. In an 
emergency situation, when rapid containment of a deadly 
infectious disease is paramount, it is challenging in any 
country to involve key local stakeholders who do not have 
specialist medical knowledge. Nevertheless, while invol-
ving local stakeholders in the clinical response (eg, as 
surveillance officers, contact tracers, community mobili-
sers or burial team members) requires training and takes 
time, mistrust can be tackled from the beginning of a 
response if there is true commitment to local involvement 
and trust-building. In Liberia, the use of volunteer inter-
mediaries by the government in its communication 
campaign was remarkably effective at persuading citizens 
to trust health authorities and comply with contentious 
control policies.75
Overall, we found limited evidence that national or 
international Ebola responders adapted to engage and 
involve local actors and institutions or respond to locally 
expressed concerns. Even when adaptations occurred, they 
were decided on and shaped by national or international 
actors rather than creating spaces for local actors (chiefs, 
frontline health workers, local researchers) to develop 
local initiatives to adapt or transform the response. There 
were positive attempts to systematically gather real-time 
data on people’s perceptions of various aspects of the 
response (an adaptation learned from the West Africa out-
break-response), and both the international responders and 
the DRC Ministry of Health employed anthropologists to 
help with this. These data could have transformed 
approaches to community engagement, involvement and 
trust-building, but we found little evidence that this 
was so.
In terms of clinical practice, there was some evidence 
of adaptation in response to locally expressed concerns. 
Some changes were made to IPC practices and procedures 
to enable recruitment of local members of response teams. 
MSF made notable efforts to “normalize” its work at 
Kayna by adapting to treat other diseases after understand-
ing that people were suspicious about MSF’s motives in 
treating only Ebola patients,4 but this case was an excep-
tion. Learning from West Africa, safe and dignified burial 
procedures were conducted early on, but changes to other 
resented infection control procedures (burning of posses-
sions, spraying with chlorine) were only slowly implemen-
ted, despite being identified early on.6 Part of the difficulty 
for enabling rapid clinical change is the time it takes to 
recruit and train local people to help deliver response- 
measures. Moreover, good exit-strategies from foreign 
aid are rare76 so there is seldom a coherent plan in which 
international responders build future capacity or help to 
repurpose the skills of those they have trained in emer-
gency response. None of our reviewed papers discussed 
this but again, West African experiences hold lessons. In 
Sierra Leone local people, some of whom were earlier 
recruited and trained as Ebola surveillance officers and 
contact tracers now continue to be engaged by the 
Ministry of Health as Community Health Workers with 
(among others) an infectious disease surveillance function, 
thus helping to strengthen future emergency-response 
capacities.
Box 2 Local Perspectives on Local Intellectual and Scientific 
Involvement and Communication
Experiences of co-authors (PK, KKB, CK) in DRC show that there 
were serious communication deficiencies alongside a lack of space for 
local scientific or academic debate on Ebola outbreak responses. For 
example, Public Health and Medicine Faculties at universities including 
the Université Libre des Pays des Grands Lacs (ULPGL, in Goma, 
North Kivu) and Institut Supérieur des Techniques Médicales de 
Bukavu (ISTM-Bukavu, Eastern Congo), would have been appropriate 
institutions to engage to help to identify and shape critical solutions. 
They were not involved, although some individual faculty members did 
provide input and help to collect data. Local frontline health workers 
were not consulted (despite being expected to implement many of the 
response actions) and frequently felt bypassed and undermined (e.g. 
when they were unable to explain the reasoning behind certain 
response actions that local people did not like or understand). There 
were no scientific presentations by humanitarian agencies or the 
national public health program that could have enabled locally 
appropriate debate about the response and more informed solution- 
building.
Communications were frequently unclear and inadequate. Local radio 
programs presented preventive messages without any scientific 
evidence; there was huge confusion about the vaccine as it was rolled 
out; and the quality of debate was poor. These deficiencies could all 
have been improved with the participation of local researchers, health 
workers and institutions.
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Across the response, a particular deficiency seems to 
have been the way in which community engagement was 
undertaken. Communities were “engaged” to understand 
their perceptions (ie, focus groups and meetings were held 
and data collated), but they were not engaged in the sense 
of taking part in decision-making or in the shaping sub-
sequent responses. Indeed, the experiences of one co- 
author (CK) show that local doctors were sometimes 
actively excluded. The lack of “respectful” or “meaning-
ful” engagement was still being noted a year into the 
epidemic.51 Respectful listening requires reshaping of 
practices to accommodate concerns, which in turn fosters 
trust and helps to change attitudes – this is known from 
Sierra Leone.10 Instead, SSHAPs data show that in DRC 
mistrust of international responders grew as the response 
went on.53,56–59 This points to a domain in which anthro-
pological investigation is directly needed – into the way 
practices shape ideas. Consulting anthropologists for their 
opinion on the culture of Ebola-affected communities is 
very different from funding them to undertake close obser-
vational study of how the practices of Ebola responders 
are constituted, and how these practices sustain specific 
forms of institutional belief.32,77 Investment into local 
anthropology and social science capacities (so that a pool 
of local researchers, rather than foreigners, can be hired) 
would make a significant contribution to building long- 
term, resilient crisis-response systems.
Collectively, the evidence shows that while some adap-
tations to the response were made, they were limited or 
small scale and often delayed. Total transformation of the 
response, to a community-led, local responder-shaped 
response was not evident, despite the need for better 
trust-building and local involvement being widely recog-
nized. Had local researchers, responders and intellectuals 
been properly consulted and their views acted on, various 
transformations could have been achieved (Box 3).
Power Dynamics and Neo- 
Colonialism in Humanitarian 
Response
It was significant that we found few documented cases of 
how trust was really built during the response, or any 
studies or documents that engaged in an analysis of 
power dynamics between different groups in DRC. In an 
insightful study from Sierra Leone, Enria (2020)38 shows 
how “power is negotiated, reproduced, and contested 
through everyday practices and encounters” (p.2). Her 
study of Ebola response in a town on the border between 
Guinea and Sierra Leone during the West Africa outbreak 
reveals how local legitimacy and power were shaped 
through and by the international response. She cautions 
against using social science merely as a “cultural broker” 
to legitimize emergency responses and challenges respon-
ders to engage in a historically informed dynamic under-
standing of power and how it is contested and renegotiated 
during an emergency response and to consider the (often 
unpredictable) immediate and long-term consequences of 
this. None of the studies we identified on the DRC 
response engaged with these fluid power dynamics, shaped 
by their historical and political contexts, between local 
Box 3 Local Perspectives on Transforming Crisis-Response in 
DRC
Local intellectuals, including those co-authoring this paper (PK, KKB, 
CK), are clear about the way in which the response interventions 
could and should have been adapted and transformed.
Lessons from previous outbreaks in DRC do not appear to have been 
well learned.
Local academic institutions should have been involved in discussions 
about how to shape the response and its communication in local 
languages. The connection between local suspicions of the Ebola 
response and previous massacres which neither UN peace keeping 
forces nor the Congolese Government have been able to prevent, 
needed to be recognized in messages as well as actions. To combat 
suspicion of the motives of government and international responders, 
other health needs should have been addressed alongside Ebola and 
local people (i.e. from Beni, from Butembo etc.) should have been 
more systematically integrated into local response teams. The 
knowledge of local frontline health workers should have been 
incorporated and acted on.
Strong partnerships should have been developed with a wide range of 
local authorities and “leaders of opinion” - through meetings/ 
dialogues as well as active mobilizing, training and hiring them for the 
response. These local stakeholders include local chiefs (i.e. locally 
recognized leaders at different levels of local government 
organization: chiefdom chiefs, groupement chiefs, locality chiefs), local 
churches (Christian and Muslim), health community workers (liaison 
health agents at health center), traditional healers (whose 
coordination office shares a compound with the Office of Health 
Inspection in North-Kivu), women’s associations, youth associations, 
local civil society and administrative authorities (territory 
administration) and leaders of armed groups operating locally.
Proper processes for local accountability needed to be put in place 
for transparency and to prevent misappropriation of protective items 
and supplies that were entrusted to them to distribute. Where armed 
conflict and breakdown of government authority continues, 
treatment centers may need to be secured, but not without mobile 
teams using local languages to raise awareness about Ebola and help 
to build trust in the response.
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authorities, residents and international responders and their 
potential for both positive and negative impacts on local 
response. Yet local scholars have published on power 
dynamics and the need for participatory development and 
reconstruction in DRC.78 The most obvious reason that 
local power dynamics were ignored and trust failed to be 
built in DRC Ebola response is that there was no will-
ingness on the part of either the national government or 
international agencies to consider the relationships 
between actors in a historical perspective or to concede 
decision-making power to local people.
Emergency humanitarian response is entrenched in 
highly medicalized, military style command and control 
approaches which have no space for engaging with decen-
tralization of decision-making to “non experts”.79,80 
Emergency response approaches tend to hold a hierarchi-
cal view of scientific “knowledge”, seen as invested 
mainly in “experts” from northern/western cultures, over 
local forms of knowledge.81 This has been called “mono-
polies of knowledge” by contemporary theorists on 
power,82 recognized in francophone discourse as “pensée 
unique d’origine coloniale” (colonial mindset) which is 
increasingly contested among the intellectual youth of 
DRC but seemingly ignored by humanitarian agencies. 
Monopolies extend to historical knowledge for which the 
contrasting narratives of the Ebola outbreak in Kikwit (a 
poor area some 500 km from Kinshasa) in 1995 are a case 
in point. The well-known and thriller-like US Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) account of how their heroes saved 
the day is the received wisdom of the course of events.83 
Local narrative, which is barely known, tells a very dif-
ferent story of how beleaguered local doctors recognized 
they had a rapidly spreading deadly outbreak, undiag-
nosed, on their hands.47 These doctors, including co- 
author CK, meticulously documented its symptoms and 
progress and circulated these clinical descriptions among 
medical circles in Kinshasa alongside requests for help. 
They received nothing for many weeks until a foreign nun 
became infected and died – at which point embassies were 
alerted, the CDC became involved and the disease was 
finally diagnosed as Ebola and triggered long-awaited 
support. Similarly, there are memorials to the foreign 
nuns who died in Kikwit (as there are to the foreign 
nuns who perished in the first 1976 outbreak in 
Yambuku), but not to the 33-year-old Congolese nun, 
Sister Eugénie Kabila Musafiri, who died alongside them 
after nursing the sick at Kikwit General Hospital. She has 
been recognized by her own faith community,84 but not by 
the medical or humanitarian response.47
Erasing or re-writing local histories in this way under-
mines the trust of future generations and becomes yet 
another manifestation of how global public health has 
been colonized in a way that devalues black lives and 
learning. DRC is no stranger to colonial exploitation and 
post-colonial neglect and in many ways here and in West 
Africa the international Ebola response has shown, as 
Richard Horton puts it in The Lancet, “how western coun-
tries bequeathed one more chapter of duplicity and treach-
ery on the history of Africa.” (p1494).3 He and others cited 
in this review are clear that state-of-the-art interventions, 
like new vaccines, can never be substitutes for serious 
efforts, properly informed by history and social science, 
to respectfully build trust and cooperation with local popu-
lations as an essential framework for infection control and 
community public health. Alongside this, building resilient 
local emergency response systems requires sustained inter-
national commitment to long-term investment in strength-
ening decentralized local health systems, so that every 
public health crises can be effectively handled at the 
most local level.
To transform humanitarian responses, international respon-
ders can no longer be regarded as the “experts” who own the 
knowledge and control the response. The role of international 
agencies remains critical, but it should be focused on provision 
of finance, resources (including vaccines and mobile testing 
laboratories) and technical support – for the long term, not just 
for emergency-response. In the future, humanitarian response 
must move well beyond its control and command approach 
that is blind to local action, wisdom and power dynamics, to 
one that enables frontline responders (both local affected peo-
ple and frontline health workers) to lead, shape and be locally 
accountable for, their own crisis-response.
COVID-19 could prove a game-changer. As countries 
worldwide question the (in)effectiveness of their 
responses, new social science discourse is emerging on 
the need to find new ways of decision-making and “evi-
dence making” for emergency response to public health 
crises. There are calls for more social science led 
approaches that are “practice based”, giving primacy to 
local voices to build flexible, listening responses.85–87 
More broadly, there are calls to reclaim “comprehensive 
public health” that has participatory, equity-focused 
approaches at its core.88
People of the world are likely to continue to face out-
breaks of new and re-emerging diseases of pandemic 
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potential, like COVID-19. These outbreaks will often have 
to be tackled in complex and challenging settings, like that 
of DRC. In such settings, emergency responses to secure 
public health will only be successful (epidemiologically as 
well as socially) if they are able to learn the transferrable 
lessons from Africa. This requires a transformation of 
international humanitarian and emergency responses such 
that they are led, or shaped, through inclusive, equitable 
collaboration with local actors and that they invest in 
developing local capacities before they leave.
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